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Abstract 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Canada studied the impact of its cabotage legislation 
thoroughly and opted to provide protection of the domestic shipping market with new legislation 
in 1992. This paper traces the decision-making process through this period, and the concurrent 
discussions within NAFTA under negotiations for liberalization of trade in services. Now that 
Canada has 13 years experience with the existing cabotage legislation, and has adopted a policy 
to promote the development of short sea shipping, this paper evaluates Canada’s shipping policy 
options in order to identify if changes are required given the new policy environment. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Throughout its history, Canada has had a mixed track record in the field of maritime transport. 
While there have been brief periods when Canada has ranked among the leaders in maritime 
trade, for the most part the country has found it difficult to compete in the international shipping 
market. In the absence of any substantive Canadian policy initiatives to respond to these 
circumstances, the result has effectively been the demise of the Canadian flag deep-sea fleet 
(Brooks and Hodgson, 2005) in spite of efforts, in 1992, to counter the loss of shipping expertise 
through the establishment of International Shipping Corporations. Given its decision not to stem 
the decline of its deep-sea fleet after World War II, Canada’s maritime efforts have been focused 
almost exclusively on nurturing a domestic marine transportation capacity, with a key plank in 
the policy being maritime cabotage.1 It has been the traditional choice of many nations to 
provide some degree of economic protection for their respective cabotage trades, and Canada has 
been no exception.  
From before Confederation in 1867, Canada has had some form of protection to reserve 
this domestic activity, first to British Commonwealth and more recently to Canadian-flag ships. 
This protection has taken two principal forms: access control based on registration and payment 
of duty depending on country of build. In Canada, only ships that are Canadian registered, and 
on which all applicable duties have been paid, have unrestricted access to engage in coasting 
trade activities. These restrictions were of little import in the days prior to the 1950s when 
national jurisdiction extended only three miles, the Great Lakes were essentially isolated, 
Newfoundland was not part of Canada, there was little shipping activity in the Arctic, and 
offshore exploration and exploitation had not been contemplated. The contraction in importance 
of the Commonwealth, the emergence of the OECD as an important international economic 
policy forum, and the extension of sovereign rights to the outer edge of the continental shelf, all 
served to focus attention on the expanded range and geographic scope of marine transportation 
and other related activities in waters under Canadian jurisdiction, prompting a series of reviews 
over a period of 20 years, leading to new legislation finally in 1992. 
Since then, there has been substantial relaxation in maritime cabotage restrictions in the 
European Union, as well as review and adjustment of cabotage policies in a number of other 
countries, raising questions as to what constitutes Canada’s best interests in the manner in which 
coasting trade activities should be managed today. This paper examines how Canada’s domestic 
shipping policy choices have evolved. It endeavours to evaluate the rationale behind these policy 
choices and, in the light of recent policy initiatives taken by its OECD colleague States 
particularly in Europe, to draw conclusions as to whether these choices continue to be 
appropriate. In setting the stage for this evaluation, the study first takes stock of the current 
economic health of Canadian domestic shipping and related activities. It also examines the US 
cabotage regime and its impact on future Canadian policy. The re-examination of cabotage is 
clearly pertinent in light of the current evaluation of the potential for short sea shipping on the 
                                                 
1  In its simplest form, cabotage is defined as the movement of goods or passengers between 
two ports or places within the same nation. It is called coasting trade in Canada. 
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continent. The paper draws conclusions about the ability of short sea shipping to prosper without 
cabotage policy changes. It then reflects upon the potential for a NAFTA cabotage regime. 
2.0 Overview of Canadian Domestic Shipping 
Canada’s coasting trade legislation excludes both international deep-sea and cross-border 
movements. It is important to note, however, that in certain specific areas such as the Great 
Lakes, economic conditions are such that ships used for cabotage movements may also be 
engaged in Canada/US import and export trade. Indeed, it would appear that domestic coasting 
trade accounts for less than one-half of activities of members of the Canadian Shipowners 
Association (CSA, a voluntary industry association), the annual reports of the CSA include 
statistics for both domestic and international operations and reports on them as one (Table 1). 
The number of ships owned by members has been declining steadily and the current number of 
ships is 28 percent less than it was in 1995.  
Table 1 
CSA Fleet, 10-Year Profile 
 
 1995  2004 
 Ships GRT  Ships GRT 
Total 101 1,428, 935  73 1,154,023 
Bulkers 38 645,153  20 351,225 
Self-Unloaders 30 610,011  32 651,628 
Tankers 17 97,681  15 93,912 
Other 11 76,090  6 57, 258 
Source: Canadian Shipowners Association (2005: 15). 
According to the Canadian Transportation Agency (2006), there are no Canadian 
registered ships operating in exclusively non-cabotage trades. The conditions imposed on 
Canadian flag vessels are sufficiently onerous that they are simply not competitive against 
foreign flag vessels. It should be noted that some of the largest CSA companies have offshore 
subsidiaries and operate foreign flag vessels globally through these subsidiaries. Canadian 
owners in international shipping activities prefer to choose a foreign flag, with 57.6 percent of 
the Canadian-owned fleet registered under foreign registry; the US percentage is even higher at 
77.8% (UNCTAD, 2005: 33). The Canadian register constitutes 0.3 percent of the world 
deadweight tonnage as of December 31, 2004, while the US flag fleet is a key global player with 
5.3% of the world fleet; the Canadian-registered fleet is only 6.5% the size of the US-registered 
fleet, while the Mexican fleet is smaller still at 2.8% the size of the US fleet (UNCTAD, 2005: 
Annex IIIb). 
The Canadian registered fleet, therefore, exists primarily to service domestic shipping 
and is comprised of a smaller number of vessels than might be expected from the global statistics 
(Table 2). Canada’s coasting trade is quite diverse, with four principal regions of activity, 
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namely the East and West Coasts, the Arctic, and the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence River system, 
and each region has quite a different profile of activity. East Coast domestic shipping activity 
consists of important container movements (both domestic and feeder shipments), domestic 
movements of refined petroleum products and coal, ferry services, and a significant level of 
offshore support and community re-supply. West Coast services are provided predominantly by 
quite specialized tug/barge operations; cargoes are dominated by forest products, but also include 
aggregates, cement, chemicals and petroleum products. The West Coast is also home to a large 
fleet of passenger ferries and the coast is also a popular venue for large cruise ships, virtually all 
of which are foreign flag and generally operate without invoking Canada’s coasting trade regime. 
In the Arctic, the principal activities generating shipping activity include community re-supply, 
oil and gas exploration, exploitation of various mineral and oil deposits in the High Arctic, and 
grain movements out of Churchill. The seasonal nature of shipping in the Arctic presents 
particularly challenging problems for ship operators, since there is insufficient domestic business 
elsewhere to keep a specialized (ice-capable) ship economically operating year round. However, 
once duty is paid, the ship is severely impeded from competing for business internationally.  
An understanding of shipping patterns in The Great Lakes/St. Lawrence River region 
is rendered more complex by the significant level of international shipping activity, involving 
both cross lake movements and international voyages into and out of the Lakes. There is, of 
course, unrestricted foreign flag access to international movements in this sector. As already 
noted, the Canadian Great Lakes cabotage fleets are also regularly used on Canada/US cross-lake 
movements of cargoes such as coal, iron ore, cement, and limestone. In some respects, Great 
Lakes shipping is quite technologically advanced, illustrated by the innovative concept of the 
self-unloader. In other respects, it is technologically backward with a rapidly aging fleet in 
significant need of replacement. The problems generated by a slow but steady contraction in 
demand over the last two decades on the Great Lakes has been exacerbated by the introduction of 
Coast Guard charges and the continuing high cost of other service support charges (Seaway, 
pilotage, etc.). 
The Canadian fleet has fallen on hard times; it is old and requires substantial investment. 
In 2000, there were nine members in the CSA; by 2006, there were seven. Three companies 
dominate the fleet—Seaway Marine Transport, The CSL Group Inc. and Groupe Desgagnés Inc. 
In recent years, there is a new type of member. To illustrate, Rigel Shipping Canada Inc. was 
added as a member of the CSA in 2002; it is a Canadian domiciled and registered ship chartering 
and operating company, a subsidiary of Rigel Schiffahrts GmbH of Bremen, Germany, 
specifically established to provide high quality petroleum and chemical tanker shipping services 
to the Canadian petroleum and petrochemical industries. Rigel provides an excellent example of 
the transformation of a foreign owner to “Canadian” for the purposes of participating in the 
coasting trade (a strategy we will return to later). 
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Table 2 
The Canadian Registered Fleet, 2006 
Self-Propelled Ships of 1,000 Gross Tons and Over Number Gross Tons 
Ferry Passenger 21 74,901 
Tugs/Offshore Supply 55 126,906 
Tankers 460 3,865,147 
Barges 23 52,983 
Cargo Vessels 84 1,227,252 
Research and Survey 1 3,545 
Dredges 7 12,359 
Source: Canadian Transportation Agency (2006). Canadian Vessel Information 
System, http://www.cta-otc.gc.ca/marine/index_e.html, accessed 3 May 2006. 
In sum, the precarious economic circumstances faced by the domestic shipping industry, 
including the offshore oil and gas sector, have changed little since the Canadian Shipowners 
Association (2000: 6) made this observation:  
Canada’s domestic marine industry faces severe challenges. Unless a marine policy 
environment which supports industry growth, reinvestment and innovation is 
developed and implemented, the industry will cease to be a competitive option for 
shippers. 
The industry has survived on finding market niches and exploiting them. As will be seen, 
there is little incentive to change existing ways of doing business, and the protected market is 
both a blessing and a barrier to change. The next section details how Canada’s marine cabotage 
policy got to where it is today. 
3.0 The Evolution of Canada’s Coasting Trade Policy 
The origins of Canada’s coasting trade policy may ultimately be traced back to the Treaty of 
Paris, 1763, which provided Britain with virtually undisputed control of maritime commerce. 
While restrictions on coasting trade within the United Kingdom were lifted in 1854, similar 
restrictions remained in place in most British colonies, including Canada (Government of 
Canada, 1957: 7). The British North America Act, passed in 1867, provided the Parliament of 
Canada with authority over navigation and shipping, but any Canadian legislation could not be 
inconsistent with UK law. This did not change until the Canada Shipping Act was enacted in 
1934 and came into force in 1936. This new legislation meant that, for the first time, shipping 
law was fully under Canadian jurisdiction. However, the 1931 Merchant Shipping Agreement 
continued the provisions favouring British shipping and requiring non-British ships to pay duty 
in order to gain access to the coasting trade.  
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The fast approaching opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1959 led to the 
establishment, on 1 March 1955, of a Royal Commission (called the Spence Commission, 
Government of Canada, 1957) charged with examining the relationship of the coasting trade to 
shipping and shipbuilding, and to domestic and international trade, with a particular focus on the 
probable effects of the opening of the Seaway. The Spence Commission was also charged with 
examining the need to adjust relevant policies or to prescribe particular conditions.  
3.1 The Report of the Spence Commission 
The report of the Spence Commission examined the merits of restricting the coasting trade to 
vessels registered in Canada. The main argument for restriction of registry was to the effect that 
Canadian registered ships best served the public interest, but faced elimination by lower cost UK 
registered ships (Government of Canada, 1957: 109). After extensive analysis, the report 
concluded that “restriction of the coasting trade to vessels registered in Canada would be 
detrimental to the public interest, whether the restriction applied generally or to only a particular 
part of Canada” (Government of Canada, 1957: 139). 
The Commission also examined the merits of lifting the current coasting trade restrictions 
so as to allow ships of all flags (not just Commonwealth) access to Canada’s domestic 
transportation. It concluded that this would not be desirable since the competition provided by 
Commonwealth, and in particular UK, ships was sufficient, and foreign flag participation would 
impair its access to allied shipping services in the event of hostilities. 
The remainder of the report was devoted to considering the shipbuilding and repairing 
industry in Canada. It pointed out that the imposition of a 25% tariff afforded no protection 
against UK shipbuilding competition, since any ship built in the UK was able to enter duty-free. 
Thus, the only effect of the duty was to protect UK shipbuilding against its foreign competition!  
Ultimately, after a huge analytical undertaking, the Spence Commission recommended no 
change in the coasting trade regime of the day, based primarily on the conclusion that the main 
source of alternatives to Canadian ships was the UK, and that unrestricted access to UK shipping 
was desirable for a number of reasons.  
3.2 The MacPherson Royal Commission 
Some two years after the completion of the Spence Commission, the MacPherson Royal 
Commission was established and tasked with examining the full range of Canadian 
transportation issues. While the stimulus for this Royal Commission stemmed from issues in 
relation to rail and truck competition, it offered principles that were expected to govern all 
modes.  
The report ultimately led to the National Transportation Act 1967 (NTA). This Act called 
for the Canadian transport system to be economic, efficient and adequate, and set out certain key 
principles to guide the achievement of this goal. These included the promotion of free 
competition between modes, and the obligation on all modes to bear a “fair proportion” of the 
costs of services provided to them. Despite significant changes in Canadian transportation 
generally and marine transportation in particular, the principles enunciated in the NTA continue, 
with only modest adjustment, to guide transportation policy in Canada today. 
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While it might be expected that the combination of Spence and MacPherson 
Commissions would guide cabotage policy in Canada for the next decade at least, the growing 
stature of the OECD, commencement of operations of the St. Lawrence Seaway, the emergence 
of containerization, rapid expansion of offshore exploration/exploitation activities and the entry 
into force of the UN Convention on the Continental Shelf led to the initiation of a further inquiry, 
the 1970 Darling Report.  
3.3 The Darling Report 
While the Spence Commission (1957) has no subsequent counterpart that matches it for depth 
and comprehensiveness, Darling (1970) has provided the foundation for domestic shipping 
policy since. Darling observed that the Spence Commission had taken the position that any 
action that would restrict competition or raise costs of shipping in Canada would be on balance 
harmful to the economy.2 Darling (1970: 3) argued instead that policy for coasting trade should 
be considered in the same way as for any other Canadian industry. 
Darling re-examined the impact of the British Commonwealth Merchant Shipping 
Agreement. The scope of study was constrained to an examination of the nature and degree of the 
protection to be afforded to Canada’s maritime cabotage activities, and was not intended to 
explore whether there were alternatives to restricted access and imposition of duty that might 
better achieve Canada’s shipping policy objectives. This is important because the merit of the 
provision of aid to maritime transport services through alternative support mechanisms (rather 
than in the form of protection through access and duty controls) has not been examined at any 
time since the earlier Spence Commission.  
The foundation of Darling’s recommendations was to retain protection as the essential 
mechanism, and that application of the protection envelope should extend to the edge of the 
continental shelf. All coasting trade activities should be reserved to Canadian ships, with the 
definition of ‘coasting trade’ extended to cover such activities as dredging, salvage, 
seismographic vessels, supply and support ships, and extending application to the Canadian 
continental shelf. While he supported the need for a waiver system, he concluded that the 
issuance of permits should be directed as much as possible and practicable toward replacing 
foreign vessels with Canadian equivalents.  
One such means might be to permit Canadian ships to take a foreign registry for 
either short or extended periods with the right to return to Canadian registry to 
participate in the coasting trade or other marine activity. This might require us to 
find our own “Liberia” in the form of a Commonwealth country with which special 
arrangements could be made. (Darling, 1970: 222) 
Such an approach could, Darling believed, result in a pool of Canadian-built and owned 
ships (manned with Canadian officers, if practicable) on the high seas, which could then be 
drawn upon for work in Canadian domestic trades as required. However, he did not address how 
                                                 
2  Darling (1970: 2). This claim was not actually quite correct since Spence had talked in 
terms of harmful to the ‘public interest.’  
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such vessels, if built in Canada or duty-paid, and with operations taxed in Canada, might be able 
to compete effectively in international shipping markets. 
3.4 Two Decades of Limited Change 
A lengthy period now began in which efforts were directed at implementing the 
recommendations of the Darling Report, but it would be another 20 years before this was 
actually achieved! In the meantime, efforts were directed at streamlining the temporary entry 
process. Efforts to introduce change often emerged as controversial and were withdrawn. In 
1979, a major roadblock was removed when all parties to the British Commonwealth Merchant 
Shipping Agreement agreed to withdraw, and the Agreement became defunct. After the release of 
Transport Canada (1982), the last substantive review of Canada’s coasting trade policy, Canada 
entered a period when the government turned its attention to the development and 
implementation of transportation deregulation in the country. 
Despite the strong deregulatory thrust of Freedom to Move (Transport Canada, 1985), it 
is interesting to note that there is little in the way of analysis of deregulatory options for marine 
cabotage in this document and the recommendations confirmed the largely protectionist policy 
already in place. 
The outcome of the Freedom to Move initiative was a new National Transportation Act 
(NTA) in 1987. Section 3 of the NTA includes the goal to promoting competition “both within 
and among” modes and also stressed competition and market forces as “the prime agents in 
providing viable and effective transportation services” but did not differentiate between domestic 
and international competition. This introduces an important anomaly in the marine mode, since 
imposition of conditions to achieve a ‘level playing field’ in competition with other domestic 
modes precludes the provision of a level playing field in relation to international competition.3  
3.5 The Coasting Trade Act 
Finally in 1992, over 20 years after Darling (1970), the Coasting Trade Act came into force. It 
essentially implemented his recommendations, including removal of the concept of a ‘British’ 
ship, thus reserving the coasting trade to Canadian flag, duty paid ships.  
With the coming into force of the Coasting Trade Act, domestic shipping policy analysis 
effectively ceased. The marine mode received somewhat limited attention in the review of the 
Canada Transportation Act in 2001, but the two recommendations made by the Panel were 
critical to Canada’s relationship with the US. The first was to reaffirm the desirability of 
pursuing a more liberalized approach to domestic shipping with the United States (PWGSC, 
2001: 146, Recommendation 8.4), and the second was to stress once more the desirability of 
removing the import duty on foreign-built ships (PWGSC, 2001: 147, Recommendation 8.5). 
Despite the excellent opportunity provided in the review terms of reference for the Canada 
Marine Act (CMA) Review Panel to make observations on other issues beyond amendments to 
                                                 
3  While substantial attention in the 1970s and 1980s was focused on Canada’s deep-sea 
shipping policy (Brooks and Hodgson, 2005), Canada continued to maintain a firewall 
between domestic and international shipping. 
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the CMA, this Panel (Transport Canada, 2003) chose not to make any such observations on 
coasting trade policy or accept the opportunity granted to it by the CTA Review Panel report. 
In conclusion, with the closure of Canadian maritime cabotage to all but Canadian ships, 
albeit with a waiver provision, and with the maintenance of a duty payment on (most) imported 
ships, and a duty-based fee for temporary entry, Canada has essentially reconfirmed the same 
protectionist philosophy that has existed ever since Canada inherited its coasting trade regime 
from Britain. This policy direction is significantly at odds with the trends that have occurred in 
Europe and with its environment where international and domestic shipping are able to support 
each other through adverse business cycles. We now examine the policy approaches of other 
major shipping competitors. 
4.0 Cabotage Policy Elsewhere 
4.1 US Cabotage Policy 
US cabotage is protected for US flag vessels under Chapters 24 and 27 of the US Merchant 
Marine Act of 1920 (the Jones Act). The Act states that cargo may not be transported between 
two US ports unless it is transported by vessels built and registered in the US, owned by citizens 
of the US and manned by a US crew. The Act also covers a variety of other maritime issues, 
including harbour dredging, compensation to seamen, and government loan guarantees to 
shipbuilders.  
Protection of coasting trade is contrary to the overall liberalized trade intentions of the 
two primary trade agreements that Canada has negotiated with the United States, the Canada US 
Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement. In both negotiations, the US 
was not prepared to relax the regime it had in place. The US Maritime Administration defends its 
protectionist stance with the argument that “cabotage restrictions are more common than many 
believe” (US MARAD, 2001). While many countries do impose cabotage restrictions, the scope 
of US restrictions is almost certainly unparalleled.  
Since these two agreements were negotiated, there have been one or two glimmers of 
hope for those interested in the removal or rationalization of cabotage within the NAFTA area. 
One is the recent interest expressed by the three NAFTA countries in the development of short 
sea shipping, and the memorandum4 they signed to collaborate on examining the future potential 
of this alternative to all-land transportation. Another is the waiver of Jones Act regulations in the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina for disaster response purposes. However, enthusiasm must be 
tempered by the clear expression to date on the part of Mexican officials that cabotage rules 
afford Mexican nationals an opportunity to rebuild their small domestic fleet for short sea 
purposes, and by US labour that the Jones Act is sacrosanct. 
                                                 
4  Memorandum of Cooperation on Sharing Short Sea Shipping Information and Experience between the 
Transportation Authorities of Canada, Mexico and the United States of America, signed November 6, 2003. 
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4.2 Cabotage in Europe 
The vision embodied in the Cockfield Report (Commission of the European Communities, 1985: 
30) was for a Single European Market in maritime transport services; this required a strategy for 
the phasing out of restrictions in order to make the European shipping industry internally fair and 
externally competitive against other flags (Brooks and Button, 1992). While the plan took longer 
than expected to implement, today any EU flag ship that is eligible to engage in its own coasting 
trade is able to engage in coasting trade activities in any other EU State. Several States (notably 
the UK and Norway) have no restrictions on the use of ships of any flag in their cabotage trades. 
It should be noted, however, that the relaxed restrictions on the registration of vessels engaged in 
maritime cabotage do not preclude the imposition of requirements in relation to crew and the 
location of the ownership of the vessel in question. 
The current state of maritime cabotage policy in Europe has its origins in the discussions 
leading up to the promulgation of Council Regulation 4055/86, one of a package of four 
maritime regulations addressing the freedom to provide international maritime services. While 
cabotage was an important part of the early negotiations in this package, it was ultimately lifted 
out of the discussions because of the significant political sensitivity that emerged. This 
subsequently led to a specific, concerted focus and effort on cabotage policy, which some six 
years later resulted in Council Regulation 3577/92, and the principal provision in this regulation, 
Article 1: 
As from January 1, 1993, freedom to provide maritime transport services within a 
Member State (maritime cabotage) shall apply to Community shipowners who have 
their ships registered in, and flying the flag of, a Member State, provided that these 
ships comply with all conditions for carrying out cabotage in that Member State. 
The regulation provided for a gradual phasing in for sensitive areas (for example, Greek island 
cabotage), and for safeguard measures should some significant commercial disruption arise.  
The process of monitoring implementation resulted in four commission reports, the fourth 
of which (Commission of the European Communities, 2002) advised that, as of January 1, 1999, 
the liberalization of cabotage services in Europe was virtually complete. The report observed that 
the liberalization of services since January 1, 1999, had not resulted in any significant increase in 
traffic or penetration of national markets by vessels flying foreign flags and that the quality of 
services had increased.  
Of equal importance is the fact that the large majority of European States also offer 
important fiscal aid, usually in the form of a ‘tonnage tax,’ which effectively reduces corporate 
taxation to levels approaching zero, as well as varying degrees of relief from income tax for 
seafarers. This State aid, formally endorsed as EU-wide policy, has the important effect of 
reducing or removing any differential in the cost of conducting operations between the domestic 
and the international sector, thus facilitating the comparatively unrestricted movement of ships 
from one sector to the other. Such circumstances are in sharp contrast to the substantial ‘firewall’ 
between domestic and international sectors that exists in Canada. 
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4.3 Cabotage In Australia and New Zealand 
Australia’s coasting trade is governed by The Navigation Act 1912. The Act provides, in Section 
7, sub-paragraph (1), a definition of coasting trade, which also provides for a number of 
circumstances where such carriage is not deemed to be coasting trade, including, for example, 
international cargo on through bills of lading, or passengers on through tickets to/from overseas. 
The Act also provides for certain trades to be exempt, including trades between the mainland and 
certain island territories, and also passenger cruise liners operating in coastal passenger trades 
(other than between Victoria and Tasmania). Ships may engage in the coasting trade by being 
issued with either a licence or a permit (Government of Australia, 1998). It is important to note 
that nothing in the Act differentiates an Australian flag ship from any other ship. 
A ship qualifies for the issuance of a licence if the seafarers on board are paid in 
accordance with prevailing Australian rates and conditions, and the ship is not in receipt, nor has 
it been in receipt, of a subsidy from a foreign government. It should be noted that there is no 
discretion in this matter if the conditions are met, and thus no barriers to reputable foreign 
shipowners. Nor are there any duty payments. Unlicensed ships may engage in the coasting trade 
on being granted either a Single Voyage Permit (SVP) or a Continuous Voyage Permit (CVP) 
upon payment of a nominal fee. 
As this cabotage regime differs considerably from others, the question becomes: Does it 
work? The Independent Review of Australian Shipping (2003: 2) made the observation that “the 
coastal shipping industry in Australia is in a confused and confusing situation.” The Review 
concluded that if Australia was to retain a viable shipping industry, it had to undergo significant 
change.  
If all sectors are unanimous on a single issue, it is the need for Government to 
enunciate a clear, certain and consistent policy towards the industry, and for 
regulatory activities to be carried out in a consistent way. (Independent Review of 
Australian Shipping, 2003: 20) 
The statement most frequently made by Australian operators was: “we can compete if the 
playing field is level, but we cannot compete if the field is tilted in favour of foreign operators 
who have different tax rules and different crew costs (Independent Review of Australian 
Shipping, 2003: 21).” The Review then pressed for the introduction of a tonnage tax system, 
similar to that adopted by a number of countries, observing that, where such an initiative had 
been applied, it had led to a revitalized shipping industry (Independent Review of Australian 
Shipping, 2003: 34). 
Turning to New Zealand, the provisions governing maritime cabotage are laid out in 
Section 198 of the Maritime Transport Act 1994. Coastal shipping control is not economically 
highly significant and its administration is comparatively straightforward. It may be viewed as 
protected in that no ship is permitted to carry coastal cargo unless it is either a New Zealand flag 
ship, or a foreign ship that has either loaded or unloaded international cargo or passengers at a 
port in New Zealand, or will do so before departing from such a port. There is no Ministerial 
discretion with this provision; however, the Minister may authorize the carriage of coastal cargo 
by ‘any other ship’ under such conditions as the Minister considers appropriate. There are no 
New Zealand ships in international trades, and the comparatively small scale of New Zealand’s 
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coasting trade (New Zealand Ministry of Transport, 2002: 12), makes it unlikely that it can offer 
much in the way of solutions for Canada. 
5.0 Other Cabotage Studies 
For an issue of protectionism in a global environment of freer trade, there is surprisingly little 
written in the academic literature on maritime cabotage. Like this paper to this point, Sheridan 
(1995) is of historical interest. One of the few papers available is Francois et al. (1996); they 
concluded, based on the first two (USITC, 1991, 1995) of the four studies undertaken by the US 
International Trade Commission, that US cabotage legislation, the Jones Act, imposes substantial 
costs on US consumers and taxpayers. 
On the other hand, there is a growing interest in short sea shipping, a development that 
may or may not be impeded by cabotage regulation depending on the region. Paixão and Marlow 
(2002) noted that short sea shipping is recognized as having the advantages of being highly 
energy efficient, while producing lower levels of air pollution, and having lower fatality rates 
than road. Saldanha and Gray (2002) explored the problems of encouraging modal switching 
while Peeters et al. (1995) viewed short sea shipping as an area where governments might help 
fund innovation. In all, these authors indicated that building a business case for maritime 
cabotage was difficult.  
In summary, we conclude that cabotage policy is under scrutiny by established maritime 
States, and this situation offers compelling arguments for Canada to examine the merits of 
following suit. 
6.0 Revisiting Canada’s Coasting Trade 
The fact that Mexico and the US, Canada’s largest trading partner, are unlikely to change their 
approaches to cabotage in the short term is a complication of substantial proportion to any 
recommendations for change in the North American context. Canada’s fundamental policy 
position with respect to cabotage has changed surprisingly little since Confederation in 1867, 
even though international trade policies and perspectives have evolved significantly. Thus, 
despite the fact that Canada has generally supported a substantial shift towards the concept of 
free trade in goods and selected services, it has chosen to maintain a markedly protectionist 
stance in relation to coasting trade. The degree of this protection, employing both access control 
and tariff mechanisms, is now much greater than that prevailing in Europe and, among developed 
maritime States outside of North America.  It appears to be only exceeded by the cabotage 
regime of the United States. In the light of these widely contrasting approaches to cabotage 
activities, it is clear that Canada’s current regulatory regime merits review. 
The present cabotage regime has effectively constructed a barrier between domestic and 
international operations, to the point where ships positioned and qualified to operate in one 
regime are unable to participate in the other. This concept is workable so long as the domestic 
regime is large and stable enough to sustain healthy commercial operations. However, this does 
not appear to be the case. The contraction and turbulence in demand for cargo movements, the 
very modest growth in offshore oil and gas activity, and the challenge of seasonal operation in 
many parts of Canada’s waters, raise doubts as to whether such an independent domestic regime 
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can continue to be economically sustainable in the long term. Beyond providing artificial 
protection for hard-pressed and expensive domestic fleets, there is virtually no evidence that the 
present regulatory regime is providing an optimum environment to encourage domestic shipping 
operations.  
We count ourselves among the growing number of policy analysts who believe that there 
are fundamental flaws in the rationale for application of a 25 percent duty payment on imported 
ships. It is of no help to the shipbuilding industry, a fact borne out by the near total absence of 
shipbuilding orders (Brooks, 2005). The facts that Canada is the only developed country that still 
applies such a tariff, and that such application has come under criticism from Canada’s OECD 
colleagues (OECD, 2001), only strengthen the arguments for its discontinuance.  
Under NAFTA, the 25% tariff does not apply to US-built ships; with the recent increase 
in the value of the Canadian dollar, Canadian operators may well find it cheaper to build in the 
US. This also applies to Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica, Israel, and the Caribbean, thus introducing a 
policy anomaly not unlike that which prevailed under the British Commonwealth Merchant 
Shipping Agreement.  
Not only has the tariff been of no value to the shipbuilding industry, it has given rise to 
some serious issues for ship operators, including the additional financing burden imposed on ship 
operators by the existing tariff situation; banks are unwilling to view the 25% tariff as part of the 
purchase price of the vessel, and so there is no bank financing available to support acquisition of 
a foreign flag vessel. Thus the 25% tariff on an imported vessel must come from the retained 
earnings or the acquisition year’s cash flow, with a chilling impact on new ship investment or 
capital replacement. No other transportation mode is required to pay anything like the level of 
import duty for the foreign acquisition of capital assets. It would be both inappropriate and unfair 
to effect an immediate full removal. Instead, a transitional phase, or tax credit equivalent, would 
need to be designed to provide for gradual adjustment to any new regime.  
As for access controls, this is a more complex issue. While removal of the tariff would 
bring some relief to the capital cost of operating Canadian ships, there remain important cost 
differentials in relation to such aspects as corporate taxation and crewing costs that would 
continue to inhibit the ability of Canadian ships to compete with their international counterparts. 
Indeed, the situation that would then prevail would not be dissimilar to that of Australia, where, 
despite the absence of a tariff and a temporary entry regime that functions reasonably 
satisfactorily for shippers, Australian ship operators continue to face significant challenges. We 
conclude that the Australian approach does not appear to offer an attractive alternative for 
Canada. 
Maintaining the status quo is also not an attractive choice. In short, if Canada cannot see 
its way to examining alternative approaches that allow for a relaxation in access controls, and 
therefore an increased facility for ships to move into and out of the Canadian coasting trade, it 
could legitimately be argued that, at least for the marine transportation sector, it would be best to 
stick with the present waiver process. On the other hand, it should be noted that the waiver 
process does not work well in relation to the complex technology and long lead times in 
decision-making that characterize the needs of the offshore oil and gas industry. Thus, for this 
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latter sector, streamlining of the temporary entry process would certainly appear to merit 
substantial further examination. 
The OECD has made clear that it would like to see Canada and others follow the 
initiatives adopted by the EU (OECD, 2001). Canada should be open to this encouragement. Of 
course, similar to the EU, any selective relaxation of access controls would need to be 
accompanied by an appropriate fiscal regime and other State aid similar to that provided to other 
States in the liberalized regime. As with the removal of the 25% tariff, considerable care would 
be required in gradually liberalizing access to ensure full reciprocity of terms and conditions. 
Pursuit of such an approach would give rise to certain ancillary policy issues. Among 
these is the concept of modal “neutrality” (the construction of a level playing field among 
domestic modes), which has been a cornerstone of Canadian transportation policy since the late 
1960s. The construction of this level domestic field gives rise to an uneven playing field in the 
international sector, and precipitates the need for the artificial barrier between domestic and 
international shipping operations, which in turn gives rise to serious difficulties for the marine 
mode. Modal neutrality is not viewed as a key principle by other OECD States, which tend to 
regard the marine mode as in need of special considerations. The manner in which domestic 
“neutrality” is applied to the marine mode needs to be revisited. 
Finally, Brooks and Frost (2004: 404) note: 
There is also the issue of a level playing field between Canada and the U.S.; 
currently, the regulations are sufficiently different that the crewing and country of 
build provisions need to be more closely examined. 
There are those that might argue that Canada should not enter into agreements for liberalized 
trade conditions with Europe until or unless such conditions are put in place in North America. 
While this argument is in theory attractive, it risks becoming a recipe for policy gridlock. Canada 
has sought, through various trade in services negotiations over the last 15 years or so, to achieve 
some relaxation in the maritime cabotage regime in NAFTA and through the World Trade 
Organization. However, such efforts have to date been unproductive, and there are many who are 
of the opinion that there is virtually no prospect of any change in the cabotage regimes in North 
America in the foreseeable future.  
On the other hand, there are those who would argue that the US desire to progress 
towards a secure North American perimeter and the new policy momentum generated by the 
potential for expanded short sea opportunities may introduce some flexibility south of the border. 
These are still quite tenuous policy thrusts, and it is important that Canada’s cabotage policy not 
be held hostage indefinitely to intransigence in US domestic shipping policy. The Jones Act 
dictates a unique situation and our research has not uncovered transferable lessons from 
elsewhere. A unilateral relaxation of the rules by Canada is simply not appropriate. Therefore, 
Canada will have to decide, in pursuing relaxation of US regulations, whether a continued 
regime of protection, albeit in a larger market, would be more attractive than seeking more 
liberalized approaches with other markets. As no research has been done on trilateral cabotage, 
this provides a starting point for a new research agenda. 
 32 
Towards a North American Cabotage Regime: A Canadian Perspective Hogson and Brooks
   
We envisage a structured research program. A side-by-side analysis of the current state of 
play is merely a start to evaluating the baseline differences between cabotage regimes. Country 
of build provisions, crewing, taxation, and fiscal support are, of course, on the “must review” 
list. The appropriateness of modal equity as a Canadian policy objective also needs examination. 
In addition, the potential common waiver options and flag scenarios need to be developed, 
including the concept of a “NAFTA flag” not unlike the Euro flag (that was examined and 
rejected as unacceptable by the EU Member States). It would be useful to evaluate the concept of 
bilateral relaxation with other liberalized, developed country trading partners, not unlike the 
liberalization recently undertaken by Canada with the UK in the air transport market. Finally, the 
research program needs to have a plan for consultation with industry on all aspects of any 
proposed changes so that the full impact of the policy can be determined. While it would be best 
to do such work under the umbrella of the Memorandum of Cooperation, it is necessary to do the 
research with or without full cooperation from Canada’s NAFTA partners. 
7.0 Final Comments 
In summary, the record shows that, in relation to maritime cabotage, Canada has pursued a 
virtually unbroken policy of protection. The nearest that Canada has ever come to adopting a 
more liberalized regime was probably at the time of the Spence Commission. However, this brief 
endeavour to pursue a more relaxed cabotage regime was quickly reversed by Howard Darling, 
and by the modal symmetry expectations of the 1967 National Transportation Act. Since the 
early 1970s, Canada has only chosen to expand, in terms of both activity and geographic scope, 
the definition of coasting trade and, hence, the associated protective regime. It is our conclusion 
that the course of action best suited for Canada’s current position is one with four action items: 
Immediately implement a plan to remove the 25% duty on the importation of foreign-
built ships, the removal to include a phase-in period or a transition plan so that those 
who recently invested in ships are not unduly penalized. 
Adopt a more liberalized access regime with like-minded States (e.g., European Union). 
Investigate more liberalized access for NAFTA-flagged vessels as long as reciprocity is 
on the table. The Canadian government needs to invest in research to determine if the 
development of NAFTA cabotage or a NAFTA flag will damage Canada’s beneficial 
owners of foreign flag shipping. Such work might take place under the umbrella of the 
Memorandum of Cooperation. 
Provide the domestic shipping industry with fiscal and other aid (e.g. tonnage tax 
opportunities and relief for seafarer income tax, when, for example, engaged in 
international trade, including foreign cabotage), in line with equivalent measures 
adopted in much of the European Union.  
The authors believe that the process of discussion and debate, leading to adoption of 
some or all of the suggested courses of action, needs to commence without delay. Within the 
North American economic space, the political reality is that further amendment to NAFTA is 
unlikely, but both the Memorandum of Cooperation and the Security and Prosperity Partnership 
signed in 2005 with the US and Mexico offer avenues for the development of change. 
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